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Repeat borrowing is critical for the long-term financial viability of microfinance 
institutions (MFIs), which provide financial services to low-income households in 
developing countries.  Repeat borrowers reduce MFI administrative costs, lower risks, 
and increase institutional  productivity.  In this paper we study the determinants of 
borrower dropout of an MFI operating in an urban center in Mali.  Specifically, we 
quantify the explicit and implicit costs that a borrower must incur in obtaining loans from 
an MFI.     1 
Introduction 
 
In the microfinance industry, which offers financial services to low-income households in 
developing countries, maintaining repeat borrowers is critical for the long-run financial 
viability of microfinance institutions (MFIs)
1.  Repeat borrowers reduce administrative 
costs, lower default  risks, and increase institutional productivity.   They require less 
administrative support than new borrowers, such as assistance with loan application, and 
repayment, and screening and monitoring costs are significantly reduced for repeat 
borrowers.   The MFI, through sustained relationships, acquires valuable information on 
repeat borrowers, permitting it to make more informed, less risky lending decisions.   
Furthermore, repeat borrowers often demand larger loans, and thus generate more interest 
and fee revenue than first time borrowers.  
 
Experts in the field of microfinance are becoming increasingly concerned with the low 
retention rates of clients in financial institutions.  Low retention rates may  indicate 
dissatisfaction with the products and services being offered and the high implicit and 
explicit costs in obtaining them, such as forming solidarity groups to become eligible, 
weekly meetings and blocked saving requirements.  This dissatisfaction leads to clients 
“shopping around” for the best available services and occasionally becoming a member 
of multiple institutions. Clients engaging in multiple memberships incur high transaction 
costs just to have access to the financial services they demand, e.g., larger loan sizes and 
                                                 
1 A microfinance institution is a specialized financial institution that provides a broad range of banking 
services to poor people in developing countries who typically lack access to formal banks.   2 
open access savings.  Therefore, understanding the reasons that trigger client dropout is 
crucial for MFIs  to maintain their financial viability in the marketplace.  
 
In this study we examine the endogenous and exogenous factors that prompt clients to 
dropout of MFIs.  The basic household/firm model developed by Singh, Squire, and 
Strauss is modified and extended to examine the economic behavior of microenterprises.  
This analytical approach is appropriate because it combines producer, consumer, and 
labor supply decisions, which are interdependent in the developing country context, in a 
theoretically consistent microeconomic model.  In particular, the model is extended to 
incorporate both the implicit as well as the explicit costs of borrowing into the liquidity 
constraint of the microenterprise.   
 
Through a unique survey design, 256 clients of a solidarity group-lending program in 
Bamako, Mali were interviewed.  The empirical model is designed to specifically 
quantify the effect of client transaction costs on repeat borrowing.  Repeat borrowing is 
affected by endogenous and exogenous factors.  Endogenous factors include contract 
design factors and program requirements, such as frequent repayment schedules, forced 
and blocked savings, and weekly group meetings.  Exogenous factors include sales 
variability, competition from other financial institutions, and household vulnerability to 
idiosyncratic shocks.  
   3 
Previous studies have focused primarily on contract design issues modeled from the 
MFI’s point of view.  This study is unique in that we model borrower behavior in an 
attempt to understand why clients dropout of the institution.  Understanding the behavior 
of borrowers is the first step in designing more flexible and cost-effective financial 
products for microentrepreneurs in developing countries.  
 
The rest of the paper is divided into four sections.  In section one a description of the 
Malian environment is provided for the reader’s reference.  In the next section, the 
research problem is examined in more detail.  The research design and the estimation 
results are presented and discussed in sections three and four. 
 
The Malian Context 
 
Geographic and Economic Characteristics of Mali 
 
Mali is a landlocked country with a surface area of 1,240,000 square kilometers.  This 
makes it the second largest country in West Africa. The northern two-thirds of its 
landscape consist mainly of barren deserts and Sahelian scrublands, while the southern 
third is forested sub-tropical savanna.  It is this southern third that is considered arable 
but, due to risky climatic conditions, annual rainfall is only adequate for 25 percent of the 
arable land.  Mali’s main water source is the Niger River, which traverses the country 
from West to East.  The bulk of agricultural production occurs along the banks of this 
river, primarily in the southern third of the country. 
   4 
Although Mali has a relatively small population of 10.1 million people, one can expect it 
to double in just 23 years, given its high population growth rate of 3.2 percent per annum.   
One reason why this population growth rate is so rapid is due to a high fertility rate of 6.8 
children per woman, one of the highest in the world.  This high population growth rate 
creates extreme pressure on an already fragile physical environment and an inadequate 
system of social services, basic infrastructure, and rudimentary labor markets.   Other 
social indicators, such as those for education and health, are just as bleak.  Only 35 
percent of school-age children enrolled in primary education and less than 40 percent of 
the total population has access to basic health services (World Bank, 1998). 
 
With a per capita GNP of US$250 a year, Mali is considered one of the poorest countries 
in the world.  Even though the country experienced significant economic expansion after 
the 1994 devaluation, as demonstrated by an average real GDP annual growth rate of 4.8 
percent during 1994-97, coupled with a drastic reduction in inflation, from 24.8 percent 
to –0.4 percent during the same period.  Yet, many macroeconomic indicators remain 
weak.  For example, in 1998 the agricultural sector continued to account for 50 percent of 
the country’s GDP, employing 80 percent of the population, thus reflecting a low 
productivity of labor in agriculture.  Also, at the end of 1997, Mali’s official external 
public debt was US$2.93 billion, equivalent to 116 percent of GDP and 482 percent of 
1997 exports of goods and non-factor services.  Mali’s narrow economic base is evident 
with 47 percent of exports concentrated in a single product of cotton.  This coupled with   5 
price fluctuations and changing demand conditions in world markets, creates uncertainty 





The state of the overall economy has a significant impact on the growth of 
microenterprises.  When institutions are either directly or indirectly helping businesses to 
expand, it is important to keep in mind that in good times the economic environment is 
supporting this effort whereas in bad times microenterprise will find it difficult to grow 
even with the best assistance (Liedholm and Mead, 1999).   The macroeconomic outlook 
for microenterpreneurs in Mali and the institutions that assist them is positive.  The 
economic growth continues to be steady over the last ten years with an average annual 
real growth rate of 4.3 percent and an average inflation rate of less than three percent 
(CIA Factbook, 2000).  Both figures are estimated to remain steady or improve through 
2001.  Several multinational corporations increased gold mining operations in 1996-98, 
and the government anticipates that Mali will become a major Sub-Saharan gold exporter 
in the next few years.   
 
Bamako is the capital city of Mali.  The District of Bamako is split up into six 
administrative districts and covers an area of approximately 18,000 hectares.
3  There are 
approximately 66 neighborhoods in the six districts.  From 1987 to 1997, the capital city 
experienced rapid population growth, at an annual rate of 4.4 percent (Sissoko-Breukers, 
                                                 
2 At the end of 1997, cotton, livestock, and gold accounted for 75 percent of total exports and non-factor 
services. 
3 One hectare is equivalent to 2.471 acres.   6 
1997).  The last national census (1997) recorded a total population in Bamako of 
1,016,167 inhabitants.  This is expected to grow to 1.5 million people by 2002. 
 
An unequal population density across districts characterizes Bamako.  Districts I and IV 
continue to be the most densely populated and are estimated to reach 145 and 104 
inhabitants per hectare, respectively, by 2002, whereas district VI, despite its strong 
growth rate of 9.4 percent, is only expected to grow to 39 inhabitants per hectare in 2002, 
up from 12 habitants in 1987.  Districts I, V, and VI are the most vast of all districts and 
show the highest growth rates in population at 4.3, 5.1, and 9.4 percent, respectively, 
according to the preliminary findings of the 1997 national census (MEPI, April 1998).  
This uneven population density affects the economic opportunities of the 
microentrepreneurs in Bamako.  More densely populated areas will have larger markets 
for entrepreneurs to buy and sell goods.  In addition, larger markets will positively affect 
their business due to an increased access to inputs and transportation services.  In the long 
run their transaction costs will be lower than entrepreneurs living and working in less 
dense areas. 
 
Informal Business Sector 
 
In Mali the informal sector employs 85 percent of the economically active population 
accounting for 20-25 percent of GDP (Webster, 1995).  In rural areas most non-farm 
activities consist of agricultural transformation and petty trade whereas in urban areas 
entrepreneurs are engaging in trade and services.   Most enterprises in the informal sector 
are home-based with the owner or a family client financing startup costs.   Salaried   7 
employees are an exception in this sector where owners themselves carry out the bulk of 
their business activities.  Typically unpaid apprentices, usually family members, assist 
owners.  In this sector, business owners largely earn only marginal profits due to fierce 
competition derived from easy market entry and exit.  
 
The Malian informal sector faces several constraints, both non-financial and financial.  
The most pressing non-financial obstacles confronting entrepreneurs in Mali are: 1). A 
constraint on product demand due to overcrowded markets from easy entry; 2). Lack of 
product differentiation due to the limited pool of skilled labor; 3). The poor state of 
infrastructure to support the development of economic activities such as limited and poor 
roads making access to some areas difficult, high per unit utility costs, a poor 
communication infrastructure hampering information flows, as well as non-existent or 
limited storage facilities for perishable fruits and vegetables (Webster, 1995). 
 
The principal financial constraint facing Malian entrepreneurs is the limited access to 
financial services due to barriers imposed by the formal banking sector as well as 
weaknesses in the provision of informal financial services.  Terms and conditions of 
formal sector loans are too strict for this population, requiring entrepreneurs to guarantee 
assets they do not typically possess.  In addition, banks do not lend to microentrepreneurs 
as they feel it is too costly to grant loans to this group.  Instead, they prefer lending larger 
amounts to more established clients.   At the other end of the spectrum, entrepreneurs use 
informal financial mechanisms to meet their credit and savings requirements.  To date 
entrepreneurs are still experiencing ruptures in their business activities due to insufficient   8 
working capital and the lack of reliable borrowing sources. Finally, of tantamount 
importance, microentrepreneurs in Mali do not have secure places to deposit their savings 




Mali has been a client of the West African Monetary Union since June 1984 when it 
joined six other member states, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, 
Sénégal, and Togo.  This Union has a common central bank, the Central Bank of West 
African States (BCEAO), with its headquarters in Dakar, Senegal and national branches 
in each client state (Ouattara et al, 1997). In addition to the central bank, there are seven 
commercial banks and two financial institutions in Mali.  Commercial banks are 
headquartered in Bamako with branch offices in some regional capitals.  To date there are 
no commercial branch offices in the rural areas in Mali.   
 
In the last ten years Mali has experienced an emergence of semi-formal microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that offer a variety of products and services that are better adapted 
than formal banks to the needs of the informal sector entrepreneurs in both rural and 
urban areas.  In 1997 it was estimated that the MFI sector already accounted for 5 percent 
of savings mobilized and credit granted by the formal financial sector.  These institutions 
range from mutualist credit unions, to financial institutions based on the solidarity group 
model.  In addition, there are several non-governmental institutions that have credit and 
savings activities.  A World Bank study on this sector, completed at the end of 1996, 
identified 30 microfinance institutions that were providing financial services to the   9 
informal sector in Mali.  Out of the 30 institutions, 24 are divided as follows: three 
mutualist programs; four village bank programs; ten institutions based on the solidarity 
group principle; and seven organizations with a credit and savings component.   
 
 
At the far end of the spectrum are informal financial mechanisms such as credit from 
family members and friends, ROSCAs, traditional moneylenders, money holders, and 
suppliers’ credit
4.  In Mali, these vehicles are characterized by limited and irregular 
supply of financial services, high interest rates and fees, and lack of security.  For 
example, entrepreneurs who use ROSCAs as their main savings mechanism are forced to 
wait their turn in the rotation and receive no interest on money saved. 
 
Many of the above statements on informal finance hold true for the clients surveyed in 
this study.  For example, 85 percent of the business startup loans came from family 
clients and friends.  In addition, 73.3 percent of the sample has participated in a ROSCA 
in the last 12 months, but only 9.8 percent have used the savings services of money 
holders.  In this sample, 52.6 percent had granted loans to their family and friends within 
the last 12 months.   There was very little evidence of the use of traditional 
moneylenders, but several entrepreneurs that were interviewed received credit from their 
suppliers on a daily or a weekly basis. 
 
                                                 
4 ROSCAs are rotating savings and credit associations.  It consists of members who agree to contribute a 
fixed amount of money on a regular basis to a fund that is distributed in turn to each member.  A member’s 
turn is either determined randomly or non-randomly by a unanimous agreement by all association members 
(Von Pischke, 1991).   10 
Background of the Problem 
Why Is It Important? 
Understanding customer satisfaction and loyalty is important from both the firm and the 
consumer viewpoint.  On the firm side dropouts are extremely costly, both in terms of 
lost investment already spent on the client and in terms of forgone future income that the 
client could have generated.  For example, in a group lending program older members 
that dropout must be replaced with new members whose smaller loan balances do not 
generate as much interest income as older clients’ larger loans do. As dropouts increase 
the sustainability of the institution decreases. 
 
Understanding customer satisfaction on the client side is important so that MFIs can help 
individuals to maximize their utility.  With this understanding banks will be able to offer 
more appropriate loan products that will in the long run maximize clients’ utility by 
meeting their business needs, reducing their transaction costs, and insuring their 
vulnerability.   
Who Else Has Worked on This Problem? 
Although leaders of the MFI industry are becoming increasingly concerned with the 
implications of high client dropout rates, little rigorous research has been conducted to 
date to determine the causes of this problem.  However, there have been several 
descriptive field studies carried out in many regions of the developing world.  Reasons 
why clients dropout of MFIs at excessively high rates can be grouped into the following 
four categories: 1) institutional problems; 2) business problems and/or failure; 3) personal   11 
(social) problems; and 4) miscellaneous problems.  A brief review of their findings is 
provided for the reader’s reference. 
 
In several of the field studies it was found that people most frequently left MFIs due to 
their dissatisfaction with the financial products and services being offered.  For example, 
an MFI in Bangladesh found that 27 percent of dropouts left due to negligence of staff 
and lack of staff quality and efficiency, 75 percent left due to low loan ceiling and 
absence of multiple loans, and another 23 percent cited a dissatisfaction with saving rules 
as one of the reasons for leaving (ASA, 1996).  Mustafa et al. (1996) found that 
individuals dropped out of the BRAC program due to the lack of easy access to savings, 
the excessive emphasis on credit discipline, the frequent policy changes, and conflict 
among client-members. 
 
In several of the studies it was also found that poor business performance was a leading 
cause of client dropout.  In particular, clients left due to inconsistent sales and business 
stoppages, and/or total business failure (Painter and McKnelly, 1998, Simanowitz, 2000, 
CGAP 1999).  In some cases sales variability precluded several clients from being able to 
finance their weekly loan repayment, prompting them to default on their loans.  In 
essence these delinquent clients involuntarily dropped out of the MFI. 
 
Another major reason for client exit was due to personal problems.  These include 
migration, sickness, or death as well as family disapproval and lack of time for weekly   12 
meetings often required by the institution (Hassan and Shahid 1995, Mustafa et al 1996, 
Painter and McKnelly 1998).  It addition, clients left due to problems within their lending 
group, such as peer pressure over loan repayments, lack of compliance with group rules, 
and large loan differentials too high for poorer members of group to guarantee (Hassan 
and Shahid 1995, CGAP 1999). 
 
Lastly, the remaining reasons why people drop out of MFIs are due to a downturn in the 
national economy or adverse climatic conditions as well as competition from other 







A random sample of 260 heterogeneous clients of a solidarity group-lending program
5 in 
Bamako, Mali was drawn to examine the factors that induce client dropout.  This sample 
was stratified based on the activity level of the client.  Namely, clients that had loan 
activity within the four months prior to the study were deemed active, while those that 
didn’t were termed inactive. 
                                                 
5 The MFI was created in 1996 to provide a wide range of savings and credit services specifically adapted 
to the needs of the micro-entrepreneurs in Bamako, Mali.   The provision of these financial services is an 
attempt to respond to basic economic needs and the expressed demands of the local entrepreneurs.  Its main 
institutional strategy is to establish a decentralized, minimalist credit delivery program based on the 
“Grameen Bank” approach of group savings mobilization and loan provision.  In the same fashion the 
Grameen model, this institution’s solidarity group strategy is based on peer pressure to enforce loan 
repayment.  In the event of non-payment by a member, the rest of the group is responsible to repay in full 
the delinquent member’s portion of the loan before receiving a subsequent group loan.   13 
 
Study Hypotheses 
The following key hypotheses are tested in this study: 
1– Contract design and program characteristics affect dropouts.  Loan size is either too 
small for the needs of the business or too large for the business to generate enough 
income for repayment.  Repayment schedules are inappropriate for the nature of the 
business, e.g., weekly repayment for seasonal activities, such as gardening or other 
activities linked to agricultural markets.  Program requirements, such as weekly meetings 
and forced and blocked savings lead to dropout due to high transaction and opportunity 
costs associated them.   
2- Group dynamic issues such as group size and the degree of member homogeneity 
affect dropout.  As group size increases, coordination problems increase which leads to 
dissatisfaction and dropouts amongst members.  More heterogeneous groups may lead to 
large loan differentials within the group, which could lead to dropout.   In this case, 
borrowers with the smaller loan size will drop out because they do not want to take on the 
risk of insuring someone else that has a much larger loan size.  In effect, it becomes too 
risky for the smaller borrower. 
3-  Vulnerability of the household/firm to systemic and idiosyncratic shocks affects 
dropouts.  Different wealth levels of household/firms deal differently with shocks.   
Poorer household/firms are more vulnerable to shocks and have smaller pool of resources 
to use in the event of such shocks (less insurance) whereas wealthier household/firms 
have a larger pool of resources to draw upon in the event of shocks.     14 
Model 
The model is based on the standard utility maximization model in which a representative 
agent is assumed to have preferences over two choices, in this case taking a loan or not.  
It is assumed that the action choosing take a loan, Y=1, provides more utility than not 
choosing to take a loan, Y=0.  In other words, U(Y=1)> U(Y=0) for individual i.  In 
essence, we are trying to determine the probability that Y=1, which is assumed to depend 
on K observable and independent variables, Xk.   This dependent relationship is written as 
follows: P(Y=1|X1…..k).   Since this relationship is non-linear, a logistic function is used 
to estimate the association between binary, endogenous variable, Y, and the independent, 
exogenous variables, Xs. 
 
In this study, we estimate the relationship between staying in a lending program and the 
factors that influence that decision.  We test the above stated hypotheses with the 
following econometric model.  
 
 LACTIVITYi = β 1AGEi + β 2EDUCi + β 3LDIFFi + β 4GSIZEi + β 5NBLOANSi + 
β 6GMEETINGi + β 7FAMREVi + β 8DGINDEXi + β 9LFREQi + β 10LPAYMNTi + 
β 11LLENGTHi + β 12LFEESi + β 13SAVREQi 
 
Where,  
LACTIVITY =   1    if  loan activity within  last 4 months; 
   0      otherwise.   15 
AGE = age of the client; 
EDUC = number of formal education years; 
LDIFF = loan differential within lending group; 
GSIZE = number of members in lending group; 
NBLOANS = number of loans obtained to date; 
GMEETING = dummy variable for participation in group meetings; 
FAMREV = number of family wage earners; 
DGINDEX= household’s durable goods index; 
LFREQ= dummy for repayment frequency, where  
LPAYMNT= dummy for repayment amount; 
LLENGTH=dummy for loan length; 
LFEES= dummy for interest rate and fees; 
SAVREQ= dummy for savings requirement. 
Where the dummy for LFREQ, LPAYMENT, LLENGTH, LFEES, AND SAVEREQ is:  
1 = extremely important reason for dropout; 
    0 = not all an important reason for dropout.  
 
Estimation Results 
Given the non-linearity of the probabilistic association between remaining in a lending 
relationship and the factors that influence that choice the classical linear regression 
model, ordinary least squares, is not appropriate for its estimation.  Instead, we use a non-  16 
linear probability model, logit, to estimate the model described above.  The following 
results were obtained:  
Table 1 : Logistic Regression Results of Borrowing Behavior in Mali 
 
 
 Variable       Coefficient      Standard Error        z ratio  P[|Z|>z]  Mean of X           
(Marginal effects      ( b / S t . E r )  
   on Prob[Y = 1]) 
 
 AGE          .4593010075E-02    .27665721E-02       1.660*     .0969      40.031250 
 EDUC      .2508768125E-02    .85759094E-02          .293       .7699      4.0703125 
 LOANDIFF   -.2809799559E-06    .31754352E-06       -.885      .3762      55978.129 
 GSIZE      -.2666897458E-01    .13592049E-01     -1.962**     .0498      6.1640625 
 NBLOANS       .7603758127E-01    .28357458E-01       2.681***  .0073      2.3281250 
 GMEETING     .8028664869E-01    .72243584E-01       1.111       .2664      .55859375 
 FAMREV   -.6368438225E-01    .75245524E-01       -.846      .3974      .56250000 
 DGINDEX    -.5747232793E-02    .27828667E-01       -.207      .8364      1.6656250 
 LFREQ    -.4588424232        .13922362           -3.296***     .0010      .36718750 
 LPAYMNT    -.2802298268        .12702900           -2.206**     .0274      .32031250 
 LLENGTH  -.2381676114        .16689750           -1.427     .1536      .31640625 
 LNFEES       -.1736046011        .10380445           -1.672*     .0944      .30859375 
 SAVEREQ      .3287126609        .25456853            1.291       .1966      .27343750E-01 
 
Source: OSU Survey Data, Mali 2001. 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 
In our analysis we found that contract design and program characteristics do lead to 
client dropout.  Three out of five of the parameter estimates on the dependent variables 
representing contract design and program characteristics were significant, namely 
LFREQ, LPAYMNT, and LNFEES.   In these cases, client dropout can be attributed to 
the inappropriateness of the frequency and amount of repayment as well as the interest 
rate and late fees associated with these loans.  Due to the high frequency and amount of 
repayment installments clients were unable to keep to the preconceived schedule for   17 
repayment.  The inability to keep up with predetermined repayment schedules propelled 
some clients into delinquency, and further into debt due to late fees assessed to them. 
 
Secondly, we found that some group dynamic issues do affect client dropout.  In 
particular, group size is inversely related to client activity.  In other words, as the group 
gets larger, clients begin to dropout.  This makes sense due to the inherent coordination 
problems associated with the management of larger groups.  As problems arise group 
members become dissatisfied and dropout.  The parameter estimate for group size was 
significant at the 0.05 level.   The second variable, LOANDIFF is a variable that 
represents the difference from the maximum and minimum loan amounts received within 
the group.  LOANDIFF is used to measure the degree of group heterogeneity was not 
significant..  This may be in fact true, but the measure used to compute this variable was 
a crude estimation of the true level of loan differentials that may exist among group 
members.  The non-significance of this parameter estimate may indicate a very low level 
of loan differentials across all groups.    
 
Lastly, household wealth does not seem to affect client dropout.  Both parameter 
estimates of the two variables used to measure household wealth (DGINDEX) and 
resources (FAMREV) were not significant, even though the direction of influence seems 
to make intuitive sense.  As wealth and resources increase people tend to dropout of these 
types of institutions that serve primarily the lending requirements, and not the savings 
needs of the entrepreneur.     18 
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